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# 1. SOVIET STATEMENT ON THE SUEZ CRISIS

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The Soviet statement of 15 September on the Suez crisis appears to have been designed to lay the groundwork for any discussion of the issue in the UN Security Council. The statement charges that British and French military preparations "grossly contradict" United Nations principles and asserts that the UN "cannot but react" to the threats of force made against Egypt by some UN members.

The statement hints that British and French military action against Egypt would have a damaging effect on American economic contacts "with the countries of the East," and condemns the United States for not protesting the British and French threat of force. It states that the USSR, "as a great power," cannot stand idly by, since violation of peace in the Middle East "cannot but affect the interests of the security of the Soviet state."

The Soviet leaders probably calculate that a prolonged UN debate would at least temporarily deter British and French military action and gain time for Egypt. Moscow also probably believes it would inhibit the West from applying further economic sanctions against Egypt. The statement argued that under the UN charter any decision to use force or economic sanctions must be determined, not by a "given country or a group of countries guided by their own narrow calculations," but by the UN Security Council alone.

The statement summarizes most of Moscow's past arguments in support of Egypt. It claims "wide international circles" have condemned the three-power plan

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for a users' association as a "dangerous provocation" leading to "artificial" incidents which could serve as a pretext for military action.

The statement announces Moscow's readiness to participate in an Egyptian-sponsored conference of the signatories of the 1888 Convention and others vitally interested in the canal. The USSR would undoubtedly insist that such a conference would be the only body other than the UN legally competent to deal with the problem. [REDACTED]

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**2. HAMMARSKJOLD FEELS SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD  
NOT DISCUSS SUEZ AT THIS TIME**

The Cuban president of the UN Security Council told Ambassador Lodge on 14 September that Secretary General Hammarskjold agreed with him that this was not the time for a Security Council meeting on the Suez crisis.

The Security Council president also believes that the users' association should not start operating until as many countries as possible join it, thus adding more weight to any Western initiative in the Security Council should Egypt halt canal transit.

**Comment**

Hammarskjold earlier had said he felt legally obliged by the UN charter to call a Security Council meeting on the Suez crisis if negotiations broke down and the parties themselves did not appeal to the UN.

Britain, France and the United States are planning to submit proposals for the establishment of the users' association to an 18-nation conference meeting on 19 September.

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### 3. BRITISH LABOR PARTY LEADER'S VIEWS ON SUEZ

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[REDACTED] Labor Party leader Hugh Gaitskell has informed the American embassy in London he is greatly relieved over the outcome of the parliamentary debate on Britain's Suez policy. He said he considers the canal users' association plan an excellent one, and indicated he favors relying primarily on economic pressure to "bring Nasr to his senses."

Gaitskell said Conservative cabinet ministers Butler and Monckton had headed a group of influential Conservative members in resisting what Gaitskell called "Eden's error of giving the impression" that Britain wants to provoke Nasr. Gaitskell said he believes Eden "has really begun to climb down," and laughingly remarked "once again the Dulles-Gaitskell axis saved the day."

Comment All reports indicate a widespread public sense of relief and a relaxation of tension in Britain following Eden's commitment to take the matter to the UN before using forceful action against Egypt.

Gaitskell's remark about the activity of Butler and Monckton before and during the special session of Parliament suggests there is some substance to earlier reports of a serious division of opinion in the cabinet over policy toward the Suez situation.

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#### 4. STATUS OF BRITISH AND FRENCH EVACUATION FROM MIDDLE EAST

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Despite evacuation of some British and French nationals from the Middle East, substantial numbers remain. Neither London nor Paris has activated emergency plans in the area.

Both governments continue to encourage the departure of their nationals in Egypt, but some 1,800 British and 10,000 French remain. On the advice of the British embassy, a considerable proportion of the British community has already left Jordan,

including embassy dependents. French officials at Amman, however, have apparently not yet received authority to encourage a similar movement of their nationals.

The French are evacuating embassy dependents and reducing the embassy staff in Syria, to four persons. Britain, on the other hand, has countermanded plans for advising the departure of British nationals. Both governments regard Lebanon as a potential safe haven.

The British cabinet has apparently decided not to implement emergency evacuation plans for Egypt, Jordan and Syria at present. British officials in Iraq have drawn up tentative plans for evacuation of the approximately 4,000 British nationals there.

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5. **BULGANIN'S LETTER TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER**

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 Premier Bulganin's letter of 11 September to President Eisenhower followed the pattern of his previous letter of 6 June in emphasizing the need for "concrete steps" for reducing armaments as a means of breaking the deadlock in disarmament negotiations. In addition to this renewed attempt to focus world attention on the USSR's announced intention to reduce its armed forces by 1,200,000 before May 1957, Bulganin placed special emphasis on the Soviet proposal of last July for a cessation of nuclear weapons tests independent of any other disarmament measures.

The Soviet premier contended that no international control agreement would be needed to enforce a test ban because the "present state of science and engineering" would make it possible to reveal a nuclear explosion anywhere in the world. It seems likely that this letter was timed to offset any adverse effects on world opinion produced by the recent series of Soviet nuclear tests.

The USSR's reluctance to be drawn into detailed negotiations on the question of international inspection and control was reflected in Bulganin's renewed criticism of the aerial inspection plan. He also rejected President Eisenhower's proposal of 1 March to establish safeguards to ensure that "future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world would no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons." He said that a ban on the production of nuclear weapons without a prohibition of their use and possession would "amount to the legalization" of these weapons. 

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25X1A 6. USSR DEMANDS EXPLANATION FOR EXCLUSION  
FROM TANGIER CONFERENCE

25X1A [redacted] The Soviet Union, in a note to the Moroccan government, demanded to know why it has not been invited to participate in the Tangier conference

25X1A [redacted] to begin on 8 October to revise the zone's status, the Moroccan foreign minister told the American chargé at Rabat on 14 September. The USSR indicated it had not relinquished its rights as a signatory power to the Tangier convention. In a second note, Moscow also inquired again about opening diplomatic relations with the Moroccan government.

Comment

Moroccan officials, who are generally pro-Western and desirous of extensive American aid for economic development, oppose ties with Moscow or any growth of Communist influence. They have co-operated with the eight Western powers governing Tangier in an effort to arrange a conference to revise the zone's status without having Soviet representation at the discussions, despite the USSR's legal claim to participation.

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